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Abstract—Smart grids offer several types of digital control and monitoring of electric power transmission and distribution. The potential
costs of inherent security vulnerabilities, including likelihoods of exploitation, are difficult to determine. This article presents a method
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1 INTRODUCTION
R ECOGNIZING the susceptibility of the U.S. power gridto cyberattacks, Congress recently passed the Securing
Energy Infrastructure Act, establishing a two-year pilot pro-
gram to look at non-digital approaches for mitigating the
potential effects of such attacks [1]. Prior to the introduction
in the late twentieth century of digital control and moni-
toring of the grid, cyberattacks on grid infrastructure had
been only a theoretical concern. To date, disruptive power
outages due to cyberattacks have been rare compared to
outages from natural causes. Nevertheless, the likelihood
that cyberattacks could severely curtail power availability is
increasing as industrial control and monitoring of power
grids becomes increasingly digitized [2]. Estimating the
costs associated with rare but severe disruptions of power
grids is difficult, whether these disruptions are due to cyber-
attacks or other causes. However, as existing grids evolve
into smart grids with new types of functionalities as well as
vulnerabilities, it becomes increasingly important to try to
understand, from a broad perspective, the costs as well as
the benefits such technologies can be expected to introduce.
Smart grid often refers to the shift in electrical gener-
ation from centralized to decentralized including the in-
corporation of energy storage, renewable generation, and
bidirectional power flow. While this decentralization may be
a defining goal for a smart grid, the process of integrating
the enabling digital technologies occurs incrementally due
to the vastness, reliability and economic constraints of such
a drastic overhaul in how electricity is generated and trans-
mitted. Many different digital technologies can or might be
used to enable desired grid functionalities [3]. However,
each of these technologies might introduce potential entry
points for adversaries [4], [5]. Thus, it is of paramount
importance to carefully consider how funding might best
be allocated to defend desired grid functionalities against
cyberattacks. Ideally, the allocation of limited cyber-defense
spending among various digitally-enabled grid functionali-
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ties should be applied before widespread integration of the
enabling technologies within the system.
Cybersecurity budgeting and spending practices often
suggest prioritizing defense spending based on the critical-
ity of digital assets but seldom explain how to determine
the amount of security spending to apply to each asset.
Existing methods for defending against digital information
system cyberattacks (e.g., monitoring, discovering, patching
vulnerabilities) usually assume potentially high but nev-
ertheless bounded costs associated with successful attacks
[6], [7]. Such real-world incidents against cyber-enabled
infrastructures, however, have the potential to cost not
only potentially recoverable money but also irrecoverable
lives. This makes a broad understanding of effective cyber-
defense vital. Building on the work of Gordon and Loeb [6],
this work develops a framework for estimating the net eco-
nomic benefits and costs associated with defending digitally
enabled technologies against cyberattacks on cyberphysical
energy systems.
2 ASSESSING DIGITAL BENEFITS AND COSTS
In this article, the analysis of digital control and mon-
itoring functions presumes as a base state the existence
of a hypothetical functioning power grid which contains
various digital technologies. These technologies are assessed
in light of the most recent understanding of expenses and
benefits associated with them, and in particular, the costs
(and potential costs) associated with cyberattacks including
defending against them.
Central to our analysis is the concept of a grid digital
functionality (GDF). A GDF is regarded as any digital
technology, or any combination of digital technologies, that
can be integrated into a power grid and potentially pro-
vide or enable a useful service to either an owning utility
or grid customer (or both). The emphasis in identifying
a GDF is based on its potential use in cyberattacks. In
general, a given GDF might be an integral part of several
types of cyberattacks. For example, residential smart meters
which provide wireless digital residential power monitoring
capabilities (considered as a GDF) can reduce labor costs
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2for utility companies, but they can potentially be used in
several types of attacks, e.g., pricing cyberattack and energy
theft [8]. Strategically located synchrophasors within a grid
can provide a useful monitoring capability for potential
operator intervention [9]. Such a monitoring capability is
also be considered a GDF, but distinct from an automated
monitoring and control capability obtained by directly link-
ing synchrophasors with certain flexible alternating current
transmission system (FACTS) control devices via a digital
communication channel. Such an automated combination of
monitoring and control is considered a distinct GDF because
it has potentially distinct vulnerabilities. Similarly, a digital
control device which acts directly in response to analog
inputs is regarded as offering yet another GDF. Another
example includes residential wifi-enabled thermostats that
provide a GDF of homeowner convenience but by so doing
introduce yet another possible avenue for attacking the grid.
An important note is that some GDFs might be dependent
on the presence of other GDFs. For instance, a GDF that
permits control or monitoring of a substation condition, but
only via digital commands from a control center, is depen-
dent on the existence of that digital command functionality.
Let F denote the set of all GDFs associated with a smart
grid ecosystem. For each x ∈ F a method is described for
determining the expected net benefit that x provides to the
grid. The expected net benefit of x is expressed as the in-
crease in value provided by x less the expected value of the
costs and potential costs associated with x. It might be easi-
est to assign dollar values to digital technology benefits and
expenses from the perspective of electric utilities. However,
a more comprehensive approach would incorporate more
general societal benefits and expenses in these valuations.
For example, from their earliest deployments, residential
smart meters have met stiff opposition from citizen groups
on a number of grounds. Aside from concerns related to po-
tentially hacked smart meters, many organizations have also
noted privacy considerations and potential health risks due
to radio frequency radiation, among other concerns [10]. Ac-
tual worst-case costs associated with potential unintended
consequences of smart meter deployment are difficult to
estimate, as are the likelihoods that these consequences will
be realized.
For the GDF of smart meters, as well as many other
GDFs, one of several possible ways of estimating such costs
and likelihoods might be to convene a panel of experts
with diverse backgrounds and task the panel to arrive at
consensus values (under the direction, perhaps, of elected
representatives). This could be done within a more general
context of defending modern grids against many types of
threats including, e.g., threats posed by natural or mali-
cious electromagnetic pulses, direct physical attacks on grid
components, disruption or elimination of GPS service, etc.
A broad perspective like this might lead to contingency
plans for cases where, despite best efforts, significant power
outages develop and persist for extended periods of time.
A GDF can offer many potential benefits. The North
American Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI), for example,
issued a report listing more than ten benefits offered by
synchrophasors [9]. It is safe to assume that the electric
utility industry is in the best position to calculate the benefits
of GDFs, with the caveat that their calculations should be
subject to appropriate public oversight. Given a GDF x, the
total value of the benefits expected to accrue from its deploy-
ment is denoted as Ben(x). Direct costs, denoted DirCosts(x),
associated with x, such as purchase and maintenance costs,
is similarly assumed to be calculated by the electric industry.
Other expenses associated with GDFs could often be
more difficult to define and estimate than direct costs,
and might be better estimated probabilistically. Here, we
consider two types of such expenses based on whether those
expenses are directly related to cyberattacks. Let C denote
the set of cyberattacks that can potentially adversely affect
a power grid. Induced destruction of equipment, power
disruptions, and theft of customer data will all be con-
sidered cyberattacks. As new digital technologies (such as
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices) interact with the grid, new
attack possibilities are introduced, so the set C should be
expected to expand over time. Let N denote the set of non-
cyber-attack-related adverse events or cost impositions that
might accrue due to inclusion of GDFs. These expenses can
also be quite varied, including such things as storm-related
damage to digital equipment, physical attacks on digital
communication devices, and costs imposed by regulatory
requirement compliance.
Given any GDF x ∈ F , let Cx ∈ C denote the attacks
directly against x, i.e., that do not rely on attacks on a
different GDF. For each cyberattack j ∈ Cx, let xj represent
an attack of type j that uses the functionality x. Let Cyb(xj)
denote the monetary value in dollars of a successful attack of
type j using x together with the costs incurred attempting
to defend x against j. These defensive costs can be quite
substantial. In the context of the NotPetya cyberattack in
Ukraine in 2017, cyber-defense spending is often consid-
ered as the most determinative factor in successful defense
against such attacks [11]. Typically, large companies spend
from 3% to 17% of their information technology (IT) budgets
on cyber-defense, with 8% to 10% usually being adequate
to “achieve a lot of security” [12]. A recent study found
that financial services on average spend 10% of their IT
budgets on cybersecurity, approximately 0.2% to 0.9% of
company revenue [13]. One percent of the $9.5 billion spent
annually on IT by JPMorgan Chase is $95 million [12]. Most
companies, even very large ones, would probably prefer not
to waste any percent of their IT spending, especially when
it could be more effectively spent shoring up underfunded
aspects of cyber-defense. In addition, cybersecurity budgets
are sometimes essentially the cost to meet compliance and in
this case account for approximately 3-5% of total IT budget.
It is therefore important to try to determine a point at which
useful cybersecurity spending becomes wasteful spending.
Let P (xj) denote the probability that an attack j ∈ Cx
will succeed, given the grid’s existing cyber-defenses and
skill levels of potential adversaries. Then the expected cost
due to cyberattacks directly against x is given by the sum-
mation
∑
j∈Cx P (xj)Cyb(xj). Similarly, given a GDF x ∈ F
and adverse event k ∈ N , let xk denote the potential
impact of k on x. Let Noncyb(xk) denote the monetary value
in dollars of k on x. If the functionality x is determined
not to be relevant to k, e.g., if x represents a software
functionality and k represents radio frequency interference,
then Noncyb(xk) = 0. Let P (xk) denote the probability that
the adverse event k will impact functionality x. Then the
3Fig. 1. A generic expected net benefit cyber-defense spending
(ENBCDS) function.
expected cost due to non-cyber adverse effects is given by
the summation
∑
k∈N P (xk)Noncyb(xk). The expected net
benefit (ENB) of the GDF x can now be expressed as:
ENB(x) = Ben(x)−DirCosts s(x)
−
∑
j∈Cx
P (xj)Cyb (xj)
−
∑
k∈N
P (xk)Noncyb (xk)
(1)
The influence on ENB(x) of expenditures on cyber-
defense can now be determined by noticing that only the
terms P (xj)Cyb(xj) appearing in the expression for ENB(x)
can be affected by such expenditures. Let sx denote ex-
penditures intended to defend a functionality x against
cyberattacks. Some fixed value of sx is assumed to apply
in the expression for ENB(x). As sx increases, presumably
the probabilities P (xj) of successful attacks against x will
decrease. However, the corresponding values Cyb(xj) will
increase since these values incorporate the costs of cyber-
defense. Indeed, the summation of P (xj)Cyb(xj) in the
expression for ENB(x) in Eq. (1) could be written:
f (sx) =
∑
j∈Cx
Psx (xj)Cybsx (xj) (2)
in order to more explicitly indicate its dependence on cyber-
defense spending. As a function of sx, the ENB of rein-
troducing functionality x then becomes a constant minus
f(sx):
ENBCDS (sx) = Ben(x)−DirCosts(x)
−
∑
k∈N
P (xk)Noncyb (xk)− f (sx) (3)
where ENBCDS(sx) is the ENB of reintroducing functional-
ity x given the amount sx of cyber-defense spending (CDS)
intended to defend it.
In [6], the authors derived, under a set of assumptions, a
function they designated ENBIS, meaning ENB from an in-
vestment in information security, which they demonstrated
was strictly concave. A less rigorous but perhaps more intu-
itive appeal to the law of diminishing returns can illustrate
why ENBCDS has the same downward-opening form as
ENBIS as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Consider, for example, the situation where x refers to the
GDF of remote access to a power grid’s Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network. This functionality
Fig. 2. Comparing grid digital functionalities.
can enable more efficient control of the grid by legitimate
power system operators but, as occurred in the 2015 attack
on Ukraine’s power grid [14], it also provides potential
SCADA access to attackers. For this x, sx represents the
expenditure on cyber-defense efforts directly against ille-
gitimate remote SCADA access. The mere introduction of
remote SCADA access, with no cyber-defense at all, clearly
renders the grid more vulnerable than it had been. With zero
spending on cyber-defense, i.e., with sx = 0, the “expected
benefit” of introducing remote SCADA access is actually
an expected loss, i.e., ENBCDS(sx) < 0. Several cyberse-
curity measures can be and typically are instituted to try to
thwart unauthorized access to a utility’s SCADA network. A
firewall can be installed to segregate the utility’s corporate
network from its SCADA network, but a firewall can be
defeated by determined attackers. Various levels of multi-
factor and user authentication can be employed to deny ac-
cess to unauthorized personnel (e.g., demanding usernames
and passwords with SMS two-factor authentication, then
demanding physical ID cards, then requiring fingerprint
scans), each successive level enhancing security, but never
completely ensuring impenetrability. Additional measures
could be taken, some entailing very significant additional
expenditure (e.g., quantum authentication). Expenditures
initially result in increased values of ENBCDS(sx), peaking
at some value corresponding to an expenditure s∗x, but
beyond that level of spending, the spending itself (intended
to thwart myriad remaining attack types in J ) outweighs
the expected gain in security. By analogy, after a homeowner
has installed a certain number of different types of locks on a
door, a would-be burglar will most likely look for a different
door or a window.
Each GDF in F has a concave ENBCDS curve, and
comparing curves for the GDFs in F can provide insight
into determining where best to allocate limited cyber-
defense spending. For example, Fig. 2 shows notionally
three ENBCDS curves for three hypothetical GDFs in F ,
labeled x, y, and z. In Fig. 2, s represents general cyber-
defense spending; sAx , s
A
y , and s
A
z depict the actual levels
of cyber-defense spending directly on GDFs x, y, and z,
respectively. Since ENBCDS(sz) < 0 always, it makes no
economic sense to invest in z at all, so z should, with current
understanding of that digital functionality, not be used.
Economic considerations alone, however, might sometimes
4be overridden by other sociological factors. For instance,
if z represents the functionality of residential wifi-enabled
thermostats, then z is not a functionality that utilities them-
selves can eliminate. There may be insufficient political
will to legislate against their use, or to hold responsible
the manufacturers of wifi-enabled thermostats for their po-
tential misuse, in which case the spending level sAz (not
necessarily borne entirely by utility companies) might be
most appropriate in the sense that it minimizes the expected
loss to society due to the use of z. As increasing numbers
of consumer and industrial IoT devices like wifi-enabled
thermostats and AC controllable loads impinge on power
grids, increased attention to the likelihood of potential losses
due to the types of cyberattacks they enable will become
necessary.
If z represents a digital functionality that could be re-
placed with an equivalent analog functionality that cur-
rently exists, or could economically be developed and de-
ployed, then that analog functionality should be given con-
sideration as a replacement for z. If z represents a GDF that
is inappropriate for the given market (e.g., power injections
from residential solar systems to a utility that is abundantly
supplied by geothermal sources) then z should simply be
recognized as an inapplicable functionality for that market.
Notice that with the actual levels of spending on GDFs x
and y, no net expected benefit is realized. With any small
increase in cyber-defense spending for GDF y, some net
expected benefit will be realized, which is not necessarily
true for GDF x. However, if twice the actual spending level
as currently exists for GDF x is available to be added to the
spending on any GDF, greater net expected benefit would
be realized by applying that spending to GDF x than to
GDF y. Dependencies between the GDFs x and y, if any, can
also be important in interpreting Fig. 2. For example, if the
functionality y is far more susceptible to successful attack
if a prior attack against functionality x has occurred, then
it might be best to divert all spending on y to x and/or
other GDFs, depending on their ENBCDS curves and actual
spending levels.
3 HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY: UNAUTHORIZED
SCADA REMOTE ACCESS
In 2015, a successful cyberattack was accomplished against
the Ukrainian power grid by gaining access remotely to
the grid’s SCADA network [14]. This mode of attack could
not have been accomplished had remote access not been
provided. Allowing remote access might create the follow-
ing potential benefits for a similar hypothetical grid: allow
increased response time to emerging grid conditions; reduce
overall labor costs; and increase safety of utility person-
nel (e.g., during adverse weather events). Monetary values
for these benefits and several others could be calculated
by a utility company and added, giving the total benefit
Ben(x) the utility expects to realize from x, the GDF of
remote SCADA access. Similarly, the utility can calculate
the direct costs of instituting remote SCADA access. These
might include costs for hardware and software, such as
dedicated firewalls, monitoring systems and cell phones for
employees, but only for those costs not directly in support
of cybersecurity. These costs are denoted as DirCosts(x).
Fig. 3. ENBCDS for remote SCADA access.
Allowing remote access clearly opens a door for cy-
berattacks. In some installations, only monitoring of grid
conditions can be accomplished, but in others, such as
the Ukraine attack, surreptitious actors can perform certain
control functions. Unauthorized access of any type, how-
ever, has the potential to be quite costly, and preventive
measures are invariably taken to reduce the likelihood of
such access. Some of those measures were mentioned above,
but others exist as well, and the amount of spending on
each will influence how effective the overall defense against
unauthorized access will be. This level of spending was
presented in Eq. (2) where with increasing sx the probability
Psx(xj) generally decreases and Cybsx(xj) increases.
A remote access capability probably introduces little ad-
ditional cost due to non-cyberattack related adverse events
other than perhaps the cost due to potential failure of its
implementing software due to the additional complexity
it introduces. Perhaps these costs can be combined into a
single term P (xk)Noncyb(xk) where now the cost k ∈ N is
basically careful software engineering. The ENBCDS could
in this hypothetical case be expressed:
ENBCDS (sx) = Ben(x)−DirCosts(x)
− P (xk)Noncyb (xk)− f (sx) (4)
Depending on actual numerical values which could prob-
ably only be obtained through cooperation with affected
utilities, ENBCDS(sx) might reasonably be represented by
Fig. 3.
It is conceivable that the level of spending in Ukraine
used to protect against attacks using remote SCADA ac-
cess was comparable to the level sAx depicted in Fig. 3. If
additional cyber-defense funding was available, some of it
might gainfully have been used to approach the level s∗x.
If the optimal level of spending s∗x was prohibitively high,
or if the shape of the curve ENBCDS(sx) was substantially
different, the Ukrainian utilities might better have decided
to forego remote SCADA access entirely, or at least support
functions of remote control SCADA access.
Among the cyberattacks in C are those that rely on
remote access to attack another GDF. In the case of the
Ukrainian attack, for example, once the attackers gained
SCADA network access, they attacked serial-to-ethernet
converters used to process commands from the SCADA
network to substation control systems [14]. These converters
provided the GDF of enabling remote re-closing of circuit
5breakers by grid operators following a blackout. The at-
tackers remotely replaced firmware in the converters with
malware to basically disable the converters. The utility
dealt with the inability to remotely re-close breakers by
dispatching personnel to re-close the breakers manually.
Such manual fallback measures should be recognized as
potentially necessary, and the costs associated with them
should not be ignored when determining ENBCDS(sx).
4 HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY: SMART METER
DEPLOYMENT
In this case study, we assume that all residential power
metering in a hypothetical grid is accomplished using smart
meters that can be wirelessly monitored and controlled.
Such a metering infrastructure, when functioning as in-
tended, has several benefits for residential customers as
well as electric utilities. Some of the more important ben-
efits include: more detailed feedback to customers of usage
(permitting possible customer savings); reduced number
of outages; elimination of costly manual meter reading;
and enablement of dynamic pricing by utility companies,
reducing power production costs. In this hypothetical case,
the benefit Ben(x) of the GDF x of smart meter deployment
should probably explicitly include possible customer bene-
fits, but again Ben(x) should probably best be calculated by
the utility company.
A smart meter infrastructure entails several apparent
direct costs and some significant ancillary or potential costs
not directly related to cybersecurity. Direct costs might
include the cost of the smart meters themselves; the cost
of smart meter installation; the cost of IT to collect, store,
and process metering data; and the costs of maintaining the
smart meters and all their associated software. Such costs
can be combined to yield DirCosts(x). Among the potential
costs not directly related to cybersecurity and which entail
higher degrees of uncertainty are lawsuits arising from
illnesses allegedly caused by smart meter radiation and
from fires allegedly caused by malfunctioning smart meters
[15]; replacement of equipment due to storm-related dam-
age; and costs of software upgrades, if needed, to facilitate
demand response potentialities afforded by future deploy-
ment of internet-connected domestic appliances. Eventuali-
ties like these are included in the set K and their combined
expected cost is given by
∑
k∈N P (xk)Noncyb(xk).
In the case of smart meters, in part because of their
ubiquitous deployment, the set Cx of cyberattacks directly
against smart meters might be particularly significant. The
types of attacks enabled by smart meter deployment include
misuse of meter functionality by customers (e.g., for incor-
rectly reduced billing); unauthorized and perhaps malicious
disconnection of selected customer service; theft, misuse,
or corruption of collected customer data; and malicious
widespread disconnection of customer service. These are
among the attacks in Cx that need to have probabilities of
success associated with them. The combined expected cost
of all cyberattacks is
∑
j∈Cx P (xj)Cyb(xj).
The ENBCDS in this hypothetical case can be expressed
as in Eq. (3) where f (sx) is given by Eq. (2) and with
Psx(xj) generally decreasing and Cybsx(xj) generally in-
creasing as sx increases. The function ENBCDS(sx) might be
Fig. 4. Comparison of hypothetical ENBCDS curves.
represented by a curve similar to the curve labeled x in Fig.
4. This graph also contains a curve labeled y which might
represent the ENBCDS on deployed digital protective relays.
Some digital protective relays can be used without remote
communication; the main cyber-defense expense for these
devices might be ensuring against resident malicious hard-
ware or software implants. Intuitively, small cyber-defense
expenditures on digital protective relays might be expected
to provide greater net benefit than the same level of ex-
penditures on smart meters, which probably entail greater
cyber-vulnerability. If valid, the curves in Fig. 4 suggest that
the amount sAx − s∗x of cyber-defense spending should be
diverted from smart meters to digital protective relays. Of
course, many other possible GDFs are not depicted in Fig.
4, and the levels of actual and optimal spending on each of
them will need to be considered in any spending decisions.
Nevertheless, Fig. 4 illustrates a potential benefit of trying to
determine ENBCDS curves for all grid digital functionalities
actually employed or under consideration.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Modern smart grids offer several types of digital control and
monitoring of electric power transmission and distribution
that enable greater efficiency and integrative functionality
than traditional power grids. These benefits, however, intro-
duce greater complexity and greatly disrupt and expand the
threat landscape. The number of vulnerabilities is increasing
as grid-connected devices proliferate. The potential costs to
society of these vulnerabilities are difficult to determine,
as are their likelihoods of successful exploitation. In this
article, we presented a method for comparing the net eco-
nomic benefits and costs of the various cyber-functionalities
associated with smart grids from the perspective of cy-
berattack vulnerabilities and defending against them. The
economic considerations of cyber-defense spending suggest
the existence of optimal levels of expenditures, which might
vary among digital functionalities. Appropriate levels of
defensive spending on each digital functionality should
take into consideration the defensive requirements of all
digital functionalities, the funding available for defensive
measures, and the concerns of all electric power producers,
suppliers, and consumers. We illustrated hypothetical case
studies on how digital functionalities can be assessed and
compared with respect to the costs of defending them from
cyberattacks.
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